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A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem

In "Elusive Knowledge," David Lewis maintained that semantic contextualism about "knows" could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem; while contextualist approaches to skepticism are now common, contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem are not. A popular rival to standard contextualism is the Gricean approach to knowledge attributions (defended by Patrick Rysiew, Jessica Brown, Duncan Pritchard, and others), which promises to deliver an account of knowledge attributions as satisfying as the contextualist's, but without positing any inelegant semantic machinery. If Lewis is right that contextualism can solve the Gettier problem, then the Gricean should hope to be able to do the same. Here I'll defend a Gricean approach to the Gettier problem, on which subjects in Gettier cases have knowledge, but on which it would be misleading to attribute knowledge to them.

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Perception and Epistemological Disjunctivism: a Puzzle for McDowell

John McDowell holds that a subject *S* perceptually knows that *p* iff she enjoys a rational support for *p* which is both factive and reflectively accessible to her. However, there is a difficulty in squaring factive reasons and internalism. The difficulty is generated by a certain picture about the role of perceptual discrimination.

A common idea is that in order for *S* to be credited with perceptual knowledge that *p*, she must be able to rule out *not-p* incompatible alternatives, where this "ruling out" is conceived of in terms of a capacity to perceptually discriminate between the objects at issue in *p* and those at issue in incompatible alternatives. However, there can be many occasions on which *S* appears to have knowledge, but she doesn't have the required discriminative capacity. If this capacity is an essential requirement, perceptual knowledge becomes too hard to get (at least in an internalist sense).

The solution I consider consists in placing on perceptual knowledge the condition that in certain cases (which can be specified) the subject should only be able to give favoring evidence for *p* over incompatible alternatives, instead of discriminating evidence.

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Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission—what else?!)

In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure Principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore's Proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean Scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. The briefest rehearsal of this kind of transmission failure will be the subject of §1. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure would be more than enough, Martin Davies has recently

challenged this view: apparently, there are more ways in heaven and earth that warrant can fail to transmit from one (set of) belief(s) to another, than have been dreamt of in philosophy so far. More specifically, Davies thinks that a second kind of transmission failure has to be countenanced. He connects each kind of failure of transmission of warrant with two different kinds of epistemic project, respectively, and with the exploration of whether the current dispute between conservatives, such as Wright, and liberals, such as Jim Pryor, on the nature of perceptual warrant, would have a bearing on them. Leaving these latter issues aside, I wish merely to point out why Davies' second kind of transmission failure is no such thing (§2). I then move on to canvass another kind of transmission failure, different from the one studied by both Wright and Davies (§3) and dependent on a conception of the structure of empirical warrants alternative to Wright's and Pryor's, which I dub "moderatism". I investigate its bearing on Moore's Proof (§4) and its relationship with Wright's kind of transmission failure and the Closure principle (§5). In closing (§6), I defend it from criticisms that can be elicited from Pryor's recent work.

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Evidentialism and Explanation

In this paper I examine a traditional evidentialist's conception of relation of evidential support (Conee and Feldman 2004, 2008), according to which: *x* supports evidentially *p* for *S* iff (i) *S* possesses *x*, AND (ii) *p* is part of the best available explanation of *x* for *S*. In this paper I present two objections to this account.

First, I argue that their account meets the underdetermination of hypothesis by evidence problem. If two mutually-excluding explanations of *x* (but logically compatible with evidence *x*) are available for *S*, then this would lead to a consequence that *S* could be fully justified in having inconsistent beliefs. But this seems at least counter-intuitive. And I doubt that evidentialists can provide another account of explanation compatible with all desiderata of their theory.

The second objection concerns the issue of condition of availability of *p*, when *x* is best explained by *p*. Conee and Feldman claim that *p* is available for *S* when *S* understands *p*. I provide counterexamples for this understanding of availability. There are cases where *S* has propositional justification for believing *p*, even if *S* does not understand *p*, for example because *S* has not yet considered *p*. In this case *S* has propositional justification even if *S* does not actually believe *p*.

Earl Conee, Richard Feldman Evidence, in ed. Quentin Smith "Epistemology: New Essays". Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; Earl Conee, Richard Feldman Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

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Epistemic Internalism and the Problem of Forgotten Evidence

Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject's perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, certain kinds of beliefs have been thought by critics to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Here Alvin Goldman has objected with what he calls "the Problem of

Forgotten Evidence” (Goldman 2001). The fact is that many beliefs are ones which were based on adequate grounds available to the subject at the time the belief was formed, but as time lapses, the grounds are often forgotten. As Goldman points out, how properly the belief was originally formed is irrelevant to many internalists. So, at this later time when the grounds are forgotten, the worry is that the would-be grounded belief is unjustified (which leads to skepticism) because the justifying grounds are no longer available to the subject, even upon introspection.

My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of two strategies open to internalists: 1) to argue that what justifies memory beliefs are memory images or “memory seemings”; 2) to employ a “local reductionist” strategy that holds that a necessary condition of being justified in holding a memory belief is having a reason for accepting the particular memory belief in question.

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The impossibility of resolving disagreement with Bayesian or linear updating

Recent epistemological literature has been concerned with the problem of disagreement and its counterpart, consensus. According to most of the current literature, disagreement constitutes evidence on the basis of which one should change her beliefs (Christensen, 2009). On the basis of that principle some authors have argued that disagreement is rationally impossible (Aumann, 1976; Lehrer, 1976; Lehrer and Wagner, 1981). Others still have advocated weaker possibility-of-agreement claims, for example Elga’s split-the-difference view (Elga, 2007), and the Hegselmann-Krause theory of consensus (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002).

There has been little analysis, however, about the meaning of consensus, the difference between consensus and compromise, and the relation between consensus formation and belief updating. In this paper I analyze the core issues concerning disagreement and its counterpart, consensus, from the point of view belief updating.

I show that, under very reasonable requirements for belief updating (see Dietrich and List, forthcoming), consensus turns out to be an impossible outcome, at least from an internalist perspective on belief convergence. The only viable externalist route, however, cannot truly be called consensual, but rather a compromise. In other words, there cannot be what Lehrer (1976) calls rational consensus. Moreover, the analysis and results from the argument raise a puzzle about belief updating, namely, the fact that we cannot update our belief on the basis of an external source of evidence such as disagreement. This latter result is in contrast with a certain version of epistemic voluntarism (see van Fraassen, 1984).

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Steps towards an Evaluationist Account of the Concept of Knowledge

In a recent paper (Kelp 2011), I tabled the hypothesis that the function of the concept of knowledge consists in flagging when a given question is adequately closed for a given agent. The aim of this paper is to further develop an epistemology that takes this hypothesis seriously.

In order to achieve this aim, I will (1) embed the hypothesis in a general view, familiar from metaethics (e.g. Gibbard 1992, Williams 1985), of the nature of evaluative concepts according to which evaluative concepts are individuated by their evaluative functions; (2) unpack the term ‘adequately’ at issue in the above hypothesis; and (3), in view of these results, specify the relation between the concepts of knowledge and justification.

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Disjunctivist Virtue-Contextualism

Recently, a number of philosophers (J. Pollock 1986; W. Alston 2005; R. Wedgwood 2009) have argued that epistemic justification is not reducible to a more basic property. These philosophers argue that coherentist, foundationalist, reliabilist etc. analyses fail to reduce epistemic justification because they run into counterexamples. However, the possibility that epistemic justification could be a disjunctive property has been ignored. I here intend to explore this possibility by sketching what I call ‘Disjunctivist Virtue-Contextualism’.

The idea is that justification could be a highly complex, disjunctive property. That is, the property of epistemic justification E may be reducible to a disjunctive property $n1$ or $n2$ or $n3$ or $n4$... nx . Epistemic justification might be reducible to the disjunctive property of either being explanatorily coherent or self-presenting or produced by reliable belief-forming processes or...etc. while which property/disjunct realizes justification is depending on the context obtaining. We can then deploy the virtue-theoretic idea that a virtuous character is truth-conducive and suggest that, based on a virtuous character, we can track which property/disjunct realizes justification in each context.

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Can we make sense of the concept of metaphysical knowledge?

Most of the times, when metaphysical knowledge is concerned, we mostly wonder about the limits of such a thing, as compared with physical or logical or ethical knowledge; or about the limitations of our human faculties (in terms of some Kantian or Ramseyan humility); or about the extent to which metaphysical objects are in fact or in principle within our reach or not (either because they might just be “unknowable” things in themselves or mere words, etc.); or again, about the real or conceptual or nominal nature involved in such items as metaphysical properties. However, we almost never relate such questions to the very concept of knowledge we favor: the aim of this paper is to try to show to what extent the various conceptions we might have of knowledge itself (either as justified true belief, or according to a virtue theoretic model, or along reliabilist, evidentialist, or pragmatist lines, in particular) might have, in important ways, different bearings not only on the treatments we offer of such questions, but, also on the types of answers we might be inclined to give to the very idea of something like metaphysical knowledge.

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Logical Knowledge: A revision of Besson's argument against the understanding account

The purpose of this paper is to set some doubts about Besson's argument (Besson 2009) against the understanding account in terms of a purported Gettier case for logical knowledge.

Besson intends the MP-case to be a case in which, even if Nate understands the meaning of 'if', the justificatory force for his belief in MP relies both on Brenda's testimony, and on Nate's understanding. Besson considers several ways in which it could be argued that her MP-case (her purported Gettier counterexample) is not problematic for the understanding account. She concentrates on two possibilities: a) arguing that Nate understands and knows, and b) arguing Nate fails to understand. Against Besson, I will try to defend claim a). My contention will be that she is quickly dismissing a distinction that is fundamental to the understanding account: the causal process that produces the justified true belief is not trivially identifiable with our justification. One is to be a reliabilist in order to assume it.

I will also consider the other points she makes in the rest of the paper in order to resist other arguments she considers the defender of the understanding account could put forward. My main point will be that all her arguments or points presuppose that testimony is part of the justification. I think the defender of the understanding account can block her argument by blocking that assumption.

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A Little Semantics is a Dangerous Thing: Formal Semantics and Logical Reasoning

Logical models of reasoning are often dismissed as empirically inadequate, and empirical studies are often interpreted as supporting this conclusion. However, this largely results from an insufficient understanding of the resources of formal semantics, together with an unwarranted assumption of uniqueness of logic, despite the plurality of semantically definable consequence relations (see [S&L07]). Unclear contextual parameters may mislead empirical subjects, but when a consequence relation is unambiguously identified by empirical agents, their performances conform to expectations.

Hintikka has argued in [HHM99] that Interrogative consequence (extending classical consequence with questions) captures adequately scientific reasoning, and has sketched for it a game-theoretic semantics. I develop it fully, assuming players with limited awareness of the future history of the game (following [H&R06]). The game reaches a fixed-point (equilibrium), identifiable by minimally aware players from past history of the game only, when a conclusion follows from the initial information and the answer gathered. When it does not, fixed points do exist too, but may not be identifiable. I conclude on the relation between this model and arguments in [S&L07]; and, through the existence of fixed-points, between game-theoretic and learning-theoretic models of reasoning.

[H&R06] Halpern and Régo (2006) "Extensive games with unawareness."

[HHM99] Hintikka, Halonen and Mutanen, (1999) "Interrogative logic as a general theory of reasoning"

[S&L07] Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2007) *Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science*.

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Where do we stand on reliabilism?

The reliabilist theory of knowledge states that knowledge is reliably acquired true belief. Sometimes an anti-Gettier clause is added to this proposed definition. Reliabilism has been defended, in various versions, by F. P. Ramsey, David Armstrong, Alvin I. Goldman, and others. In the talk, I plan to consider four major objections to the theory. They are the problems of (1) generality, (2) value, (3) easy knowledge and (4) Gettier. Time permitting I will also contemplate Laurence Bonjour's clairvoyance examples. My main question is to what extent reliabilism is vulnerable to these difficulties once it is viewed as an explication of knowledge. By an explication I mean, following Rudolf Carnap, a proposal to replace our ordinary concept with a concept that is more useful, simple and precise while not departing too much from ordinary language. The notion of an explication is important because scientific definitions are arguably of that kind, and if philosophy should mimic science, as many reliabilists would insist it should, it is natural, or arguably even mandatory, to think of theories of knowledge in this way. My working hypothesis is that reliabilism qua explication does not fall prey to the objections.

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Nonconceptual Experience and Justification

I defend nonconceptualism against the conceptualist objection that perceptual experience can play a role for the justification of empirical belief only if its content is conceptual. The conceptualist argument presupposes that justification is inferential. If so, the argument goes, a perceptual experience as well as the belief it justifies must have propositional content of the same kind. To be the premise in an argument which supports, as its conclusion, the belief content in question, a perceptual content has to be truth-evaluable and it has to be constituted by the same kind of re-combinable elements as the belief content. On the standard view, this means that perceptual content must consist in Fregean propositions.

I defend nonconceptualism by showing that nonconceptual (non-Fregean) perceptual content fulfills what is plausible about these assumptions. To do so, I propose a quasi-inferential nonconceptualist account of the justification of basic empirical belief. Essential elements of this account are the claim that nonconceptual content has correctness conditions, that the relation between a perceptual experience and a perceptual belief can therefore transfer correctness/truth, and that there can be semantic relations between a perceptual experience and the belief based on it because both mental states represent the same things in the subject's environment, and so have the same content, externally individuated.

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Is Mentalism Epistemological Ur-Internalism?

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (Conee & Feldman 2004; Conee 2007) claim that mentalism captures the essence of internalist epistemology. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one—viz., accessibilist internalism—in that mentalism does not treat as necessary requirements which stipulate that a subject must have reflective access to the facts which justify her beliefs in order that those beliefs be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental life of the subject.

I argue that mentalism is not the ur-internalism which Conee and Feldman claim it is. My strategy is to demonstrate that the strong supervenience of justification on the mental to which Conee and Feldman appeal is consistent with a radical form of externalism about the vehicles of mental content (see, e.g., Hurley 1998 and Clark & Chalmers 1998). Briefly, externalism about the vehicles of mental content claims that the very states of belief, desire and so forth may actively and constitutively depend on factors outside the bodily individual. This being the case, I claim Conee and Feldman's supervenience principle no longer suits the purposes to which they wish to put it.

The presentation will proceed as follows. I will first explain mentalism as espoused by Conee and Feldman. Then I will outline the threat vehicle externalism poses to mentalism's status as ur-internalism. Finally, I discuss how a mentalist might amend her position in response to my arguments, concluding that no response appears satisfactory.

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Counter-Closure: Knowledge and Justified Belief

According to the principle of Counter-Closure for knowledge, single-premise deductive inference cannot yield knowledge of a conclusion from an unknown premise, at least when the conclusion is believed solely on the basis of competent deduction from that premise:

Knowledge Counter-Closure (KCC): Necessarily, if (i) *S* believes *q* solely on the basis of competent deduction from *p*, and (ii) *S* knows *q*, then *S* knows *p*.

While KCC is widely endorsed, recently some challenges to this principle have arisen: Warfield (2005) argues that deductive knowledge from falsehood is possible; Fitelson (forthcoming) claims that if Warfield is right, then deductive knowledge from essential falsehood is also possible; and Luzzi (2010) suggests that deductive knowledge may arise from Gettiered belief.

I explore whether justified belief can rank, alongside truth and non-Gettierization, as a necessary condition on knowledge that can be exploited in constructing challenges to KCC. In particular, I investigate whether KCC failures may arise because a deductive inference displays an unjustified (hence unknown) premise but a justified (hence knowable) conclusion. Such cases, if possible, would falsify the principle of Counter-Closure for justified belief:

Justified Belief Counter-Closure (JBCC): Necessarily, if (i) *S* believes *q* solely on the basis of competent deduction from *p* and (ii) *S* has a justified belief that *q*, then *S* has a justified belief that *p*.

I argue that no such cases are possible, then explain why an endorsement of JBCC is compatible with a rejection for KCC by appeal to the idea of epistemic responsibility.

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Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: the Whole Story?

According to Duncan Pritchard's Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE), knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive traits that make up one's cognitive character, such that one's cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to one's cognitive character (Pritchard et. al 2010: 55). I argue via counterexample that this definition is insufficient for knowledge. In addition, a plausible intuition regarding the agent's epistemic circumstances (the intuition that the safer the epistemic circumstances are, the less cognitive ability is required in order to know) reveals a challenging dilemma for ALVE: certain type of cases seem to push ALVE to strengthen its virtue-theoretic condition while other types to weaken it and hence they pull the theory in opposing directions, at the risk of splitting the theory into two dissociated parts.

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Demystifying Dilation

Dilation occurs when upper and lower probability estimates of some event *E* are properly included in the upper and lower probability estimates of the probability of *E* conditional on another event *F*, resulting in a change from a more precise estimate of *E* to a less precise estimate of *E* upon learning *F*. Strict dilation occurs when *E* is diluted by every event in a partition, which means that sometimes *E* becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Many think that strict dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, a point often overlooked in critical discussions of dilation is that knowing that *E* is stochastically independent of *F* (for all *F* in a partition) is sufficient to avoid strict dilation. Since the most sensational alleged dilation examples are those which play up independence between dilator and dilatee, the sensationalism traces to mishandling imprecise probabilities rather than revealing a genuine puzzle about imprecise probabilities.

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Skepticism as a Problem of Reevaluation

The problem of Cartesian skepticism occurs as the following argument: If *S* has knowledge of the external world, then *S* knows that she is not a brain in a vat. *S* does not know that she is not a brain in a vat. Therefore, *S* does not have knowledge of the external world. The skeptical argument is valid. Therefore, it confronts us with a kind of paradox or dilemma: Each of its premises seems plausible but its conclusion seems unacceptable.

The aim of this paper is to solve the problem of Cartesian skepticism and to explain its apparent plausibility. The proposed solution to the skeptical problem is Mooreanism, which is already at hand: We have knowledge about the external world and, therefore, we know that the

skeptical hypothesis is false. What remains to be done is to explain the plausibility of the skeptical argument and the intuitive implausibility of Moorean solutions. For achieving this goal, I will distinguish two cognitive processes, first, ordinary knowledge acquisition and, second, higher-order knowledge by doubting and reevaluating one's own beliefs. I will argue that our intuitions about the plausibility of skepticism and the implausibility of Mooreanism only concern knowledge of the second type. Hence, we can know that the skeptical hypothesis is false, but we cannot successfully reevaluate this belief, if we put it into doubt. I conclude that skepticism is a problem of reevaluation, but not one of ordinary knowledge acquisition.

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A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision

The present paper aims to integrate the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science into belief revision theory. Among other things, this integration allows for a substantial simplification of the ranking information that is necessary to define revisions and contractions in a unique manner. In classical belief revision theory, some form of ranking is needed that orders any item of the belief set. Standard concepts to introduce this ranking are the relation of epistemic entrenchment (Gärdenfors 1988) and Spohn's ordinal conditional functions (Spohn 1988). In the hybrid system of the present paper, by contrast, it is only theory-elements, i.e., pieces of background theories, that need to have a ranking. A clear statistical explanation in terms of successful applications can be given for this ranking. Our thesis is that epistemic ranking is an effect of theorizing and hence requires, for it to be investigated, an analysis of how theorizing governs our beliefs. Another alleged merit of the hybrid system of the present paper is its being expressive enough to capture complex and non-trivial scientific examples. For the system inherits and, moreover, extends the expressivity of structuralist theory of science. It is thus closely related to a novel research area within belief revision theory that addresses the dynamics of scientific knowledge (cf. Olsson 2011).

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The Epistemology of Conditionals

There are reasons to believe that theories of acceptability, assertability, and belief change as developed by epistemologists and philosophers of language, though meant to apply quite generally, do not apply to conditionals. We present both formal and empirical results that may help to develop theories of the said kinds specifically suited for conditionals.

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Disagreement, Difference-Splitting, and Level-Connections

According to the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement, when I learn that a known epistemic peer disagrees with me, I am often rationally required to defer to her judgment to the point of

splitting the difference. The view has recently attracted a great deal of attention. In favor of the Equal Weight View, it is argued that disagreement with an epistemic peer constitutes what David Christensen calls "higher-order evidence": "evidence suggesting my own epistemic failure." Rational self-doubt, defenders of the view claim, demands conciliation. Against the Equal Weight View, it is argued that disagreement about the Equal Weight View renders the view self-undermining. If enough peers believe a Rival View, they argue, then we'll be rationally required both to believe the Rival View and to follow the Equal Weight View, which is incoherent.

Both of these lines of argument depend on certain level-connection principles: principles to the effect that rationality demands a certain sort of coherence between our 'first-order' beliefs and our 'higher-order' beliefs about what we're rationally required to believe. Rather than arguing for or against the Equal Weight View, I will here argue that both of the above arguments are unsuccessful. Contrary to the view's defenders, the argument for the Equal Weight View from level-connection principles fails badly. Contrary to the view's detractors, level-connection principles generate rational dilemmas for all theories of disagreement.

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Disagreement and Epistemological Internalism and Externalism

Most if not all recent epistemological debates about disagreement work with a strikingly unarticulated and pre-theoretical notion of rationality or rational belief. Claims about what one rationally ought to do when faced with peer disagreement are supported by more or less elaborate scenarios that are supposed to function as intuition-pumps and produce the right verdicts. As a result, insights related to notions such as rationality, justification, and warrant from earlier literature are not employed to analyze the topic of disagreement.

I submit that this is rather unfortunate, because how one conceives of rationality matters a great deal for one's views on the right response to disagreement with peers. In this paper, then, I want to explore how the distinction between internalist and externalist construals of rationality bears on disagreement. In particular, I will argue (1) that an internalist understanding of rationality entails a conciliationist view — i.e., a view according to which peer disagreement ought to lead one to adjust one's confidence in the controversial belief — and (2) that an externalist understanding of rationality dovetails nicely with a steadfast view — i.e., a view according to which adjustment of confidence is not called for — but does not entail it. In particular, one's take on how to defeat defeaters rationally provides externalists with some wiggle room between conciliationism and steadfastness.

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Justification, Entitlement, and the Bootstrapping Problem

According to the bootstrapping problem, any view that allows for basic knowledge (knowledge obtained from a reliable source prior to one's knowing that that source is reliable) is forced to accept that one can utilize a track-record argument to acquire justification for believing that one's belief source is reliable; yet, we tend to think that acquiring justification in this way is too easy. In this paper I argue, first, that those who respond to the bootstrapping problem by deny-

ing basic knowledge succumb to over-intellectualizing epistemology, and secondly, reliabilist views avoid over-intellectualization only at the expense of sanctioning bootstrapping as a benign procedure. Both of these outcomes are difficult to bear. To ward off each of these unsavory outcomes, I propose an alternative solution that relies on a distinction between two separate epistemic concepts: entitlement and justification. Drawing upon the works of Tyler Burge, I suggest that one's various non-inferentially obtained beliefs, like perceptual beliefs, can constitute basic knowledge because one has epistemic entitlements to hold them. But if one's higher-order belief about the reliability of a belief source is to constitute knowledge, one would have to be justified, not entitled, to hold it. Yet, because the standards for justification are higher than they are for entitlement, I argue that one cannot acquire justification for this higher-order belief simply by constructing a track-record argument. The upshot is that we can allow for basic knowledge without being forced to sanction bootstrapping as legitimate.

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Not My Error: Knowledge, Subject-centering and Normal Possibilities of Error

Modal accounts of knowledge share the idea that knowledge is mainly a matter of avoidance of error: one knows only if one is not mistaken and could not be mistaken at certain relevant alternative situations. Reliability, sensitivity, safety, and relevant alternative conditions share this general form – though they differ on the ranges of error they take to be relevant and on whether error is to be avoided at all or most cases in those ranges.

An avoidance of error requirement is subject-centered if the possibilities of error that matter for it to be satisfied by a subject in a case are only errors involving the very same subject. For instance, on a subject-centered version of safety, what matters for my knowing is that I could not have easily been mistaken, not whether *somebody else* could easily have. Most avoidance-of-error requirements in the literature are subject-centered (Nozick, 1981, Sosa, 1999, Pritchard, 2005).

In this paper I argue that against subject-centering. Giving it up dramatically increases the ranges of relevant error possibilities and raises a skeptical worry. I introduce normality considerations to deal with it. The discussion sheds light on a number of puzzling cases for safety approaches: protective angel cases (Hawthorne 2004, 56n, Pritchard 2010) and unsafe knowledge cases (Comesaña 2005).

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Knowledge, Truth by Luck, and What Solves the Gettier Problem

It is easy to generate a string of cases of the sort that Edmund Gettier used to convince generations of philosophers that something was amiss with the view that knowledge just is justified true belief. It is considerably more difficult - to say the least - to provide a solution to the Gettier Problem. Indeed, it does not seem that any proposed solution to the Gettier Problem has gained support outside the often fairly small circles that sponsor them. How can it be that that an easily graspable shortcoming of a definition of a concept that we use so often is so difficult to unravel? Another quite puzzling feature is this: why is it that proposed solutions to the Gettier Problem

so often are susceptible to intricate counter-examples of the same general family, rather than new to problems or other types of counter-examples? And what is the solution to the Gettier Problem, anyway? In this paper, I propose a new unified view about the Gettier Problem, a view that includes a diagnosis of the problem that suggests answers to the sort of questions just mentioned, as well as a generic solution to the Gettier Problem.

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Disagreement: the case of epistemic peers

In recent years, epistemology has put much attention on disagreement cases in which there are involved people so-called epistemic peers. The debate hinges on the following question: does disagreement affect peers' doxastic attitudes towards the original beliefs? In the paper I argue that before giving an answer, we have to clarify the very notion of notion of epistemic peerhood: I will propose a new definition of epistemic peerhood that is supposed to fill the gap of the definitions commonly shared in literature, and I will describe a pragmatic-theoretic device for handling epistemic peerhood in a conversation. The second part of the paper applies the previous analysis by exploring a case of peer disagreement and discussing its epistemic significance. According to the widespread view, called "Equal Weight View", one should give equal weight to a judgment of a peer and to one own judgment. I argue that this position has some undesired consequences, and that the peers should embrace the "Stick to One's Guns View", according to which they can keep on sustaining their respective views. In the last part of the paper I develop this view by showing that it does not suffer of the problems of the "Equal Weight View" and has three positive aspects.

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The Epistemology of Stupidity

Stupidity is not a very attended epistemological phenomenon. But it surfaces in e.g. criticisms of reliabilism which emphasize that mere maximization of true beliefs will no yield relevant knowledge and understanding (Elgin 1988). It also surfaces within virtue epistemology (stupidity is an epistemic vice). Reliabilism, however, has a reply, similar to the one it gives to the problem of the value of knowledge (Olsson 2008). I focus in this article on the neglected notion of wisdom (see however Lehrer 1997) and argue that a proper account of being wise will, if not save us from stupidity, at least minimize our chances to fall into it.

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Logic, Reasoning, and Revision

Harman's view that logic isn't specially relevant for reasoning (Harman [1986]) is best viewed as a multi-faceted objection to the received view that the laws of logic are (or provide) general as well as infallible rules for reasoning, rather than as a focused attack on this view.

By focusing on so-called rational failures of deductive cogency, and individuating four different attitudes towards them, I show how we can resist Harman's conclusion. On one account, a failure of deductive cogency is rational whenever Γ entails φ , but believing φ conditional on Γ is itself irrational. Namely, φ cannot be accepted while (a) any revision of Γ that does not entail φ is arbitrary and therefore irrational as well (cf. the paradox of the preface), (b) there is no immediate way to revise Γ , or (c) revising Γ is too costly. The four different attitudes are simple revisionism, sophisticated revisionism, basic skepticism, and critical skepticism. The following theses are defended:

1. The simple revisionist and the basic skeptic make the same mistake. They assume that because the rules of (classical) logic have no exceptions, norms based on this logic should also be exceptionless.
2. Taking the role of logic in reasoning seriously commits us either to sophisticated revisionism or to critical skepticism.
3. The sophisticated revisionist and the critical skeptic do not need to disagree about the appropriate formalism to model norms for reasoning. They only disagree on how the formalism should be understood.

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Defeasible Conditionalization

The applicability of Bayesian conditionalization in setting one's posterior probability for a proposition, α , is limited to cases where the value of a corresponding prior probability, $P_{PRI}(\alpha/AE)$, is available (where AE represents one's complete body of evidence). In order to extend probability updating to cases where the prior probabilities needed for Bayesian conditionalization are unavailable, I introduce an inference schema, defeasible conditionalization, which allows one to update one's personal probability in a proposition by conditioning on a proposition that represents a proper subset of one's complete body of evidence. While defeasible conditionalization has wider applicability than Bayesian conditionalization (since it may be used when the value of a relevant prior probability, $P_{PRI}(\alpha/AE)$, is unavailable), there are circumstances under which some instances of defeasible conditionalization are unreasonable. To address this difficulty, I outline the conditions under which instances of defeasible conditionalization are defeated.

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Can We Make Sense of Degrees of Belief?

This paper, first, explores the largely unexplored terrain of what might be called 'the metaphysics of degrees'. This part discusses the following questions: (1) which sentences that *prima facie* affirm that something comes in degrees make sense, and which don't? (2) Is there one phenomenon referred to in those degree-sentences that make sense, or are there several? (3) Which thing, if any, really allow of degrees? The main results of this first part are, in the second part, applied to the problem of 'degrees of belief'.

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Voting, Deliberation and Truth

There are various ways to reach a group decision. One is to simply vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses -- a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy (as everybody endorses the consensus), it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. What is more, a deliberation is easy to bias as those group members who make others change their mind may not necessarily be the best truth-trackers. But even if no such biases are present, the consensus may be far away from the truth. And so we ask: Is deliberation a better method than simple majority voting if the group's goal is to track the truth? To address this question, we propose a Bayesian model of rational deliberation and compare it to the straight forward voting procedure. The talk is based on joint work with Soroush Rafiee Rad (Tilburg).

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Non-Inferentialism and Testimony-Based Belief

Non-inferentialist theories of justification have been invoked in various sub-fields of epistemology: for example, as accounts of self-knowledge or of perceptual knowledge. It has also become a fairly common view in the epistemology of testimony that testimony-based belief (TBB) is justified non-inferentially. On this view, the fixation of TBB is characterized as direct, unmediated, immediate, implicit, or automatic. It is also sometimes characterized as belief-independent. Yet the former (rather metaphorical) characterizations of non-inferential TBB are not themselves explanatory or persuasive, while the potentially sharper idea of belief-independence does not accord with evidence of the rich linguistic and social cognition underlying TBB in particular, nor with intuitions about the justificatory role of those cognitive processes. The fixation of TBB implicates evidential states (including beliefs) to such an extent that the proposed independence of TBB-justification from those states is not well-supported. Whatever the ultimate appeal of non-inferentialism as applied to self-knowledge and perceptual beliefs, non-inferentialism regarding testimonial justification is implausible.

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Hypothesis Formation out of a Single Agent's Background Knowledge

In epistemic logics, most of the focus has traditionally been on the modal operator \Box -- mostly written as K_a -- representing an epistemic agent a having knowledge of the proposition it precedes. Although the dual operator \Diamond has never been neglected, most of the times, it just got a secondary meaning. Still, if we focus on the process of hypothesis formation, we can construct an interesting meaning for this operator.

This is so because of two formal properties that a rational formed hypothesis should have. Firstly, one can hardly call an agent forming hypotheses incompatible with his knowledge, rational. So, if an agent's knowledge is represented by formulas of the form $\Box p$, there is no objection to use the form $\Diamond p$ to represent formed hypotheses. Secondly, hypotheses cannot be formed out of the blue. An agent can only form hypotheses that are in some way linked with the things he knows. Or, put in other words, he derives them – defeasibly – from his knowledge.

My aim is to present a logic for Hypothesis Formation that will enable us to model hypothesis formation out of a single agent's background knowledge via one of the most well-known schemas of defeasible reasoning, i.e. the abductive schema of 'affirming the antecedent' ($B, A \supset B / A$). Since the formation of hypotheses is a defeasible process, this logic necessarily needs to be a defeasible or non-monotonic logic. But, because we still want a stable description of the knowledge of our agent, we want the logic to contain a monotonic fragment that models his knowledge. This will be obtained by presenting an adaptive epistemic logic in standard format in which $\Diamond p$ has the meaning "it is for an agent rational to put forward the hypothesis that p ."

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Epistemic Agency and Epistemic Motivation

Epistemic agency is the central bone of contention in the three hottest epistemology debates today: doxastic voluntarism versus involuntarism; justification- versus virtue-centered conceptions of knowledge; and reliabilism versus responsibilism about epistemic virtue. Yet our conception of epistemic agency is at present too feeble to play such a serious role. This talk targets one particular point of feebleness: the notion of motivation lies at the heart of the traditional concept of agency, yet most friends of epistemic agency don't seem to care about epistemic motivation. I argue for four claims:

(1) We should think about epistemic motivation not only because it illuminates epistemic agency, but also because it gives us a powerful tool for understanding the nature of epistemic normativity.

(2) We should be anti-Humeans about epistemic motivation.

(3) Talk of motivation is appropriate in the epistemic context (something that's not obvious): if it weren't, we could not explain the distinctions between (i) a cause of belief and a reason for belief; and (ii) justified and unjustified beliefs.

(4) This stance on epistemic motivation affects all three central epistemology debates above: it speaks in favor of at least weak voluntarism, virtue-centered epistemologies, and a qualified responsibilism.

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I Know: The First Person and Skepticism

The paper addresses the issue of first-person knowledge ascriptions and their relevance to epistemic skepticism. It is argued that first-person epistemic ascriptions, in particular assertions of

the form "I know that...", easily lead us to mistake the assertion conditions of epistemic ascriptions for part of the truth conditions. It is shown that the skeptical argument from ignorance receives its apparent plausibility mainly from this confusion and, therefore, from the widespread first-person approach to epistemological questions.

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Three Conceptions of Practical Knowledge

There is a distinction (of some kind) to be drawn between practical and ordinary propositional knowledge, and paradigmatic instances of *knowledge-how* are instances of practical knowledge. This much is relatively uncontroversial. But what is practical knowledge, and how does it differ from ordinary propositional knowledge? There are two standard alternatives in the *knowledge-how* literature. The Rylean holds that *knowledge-how* is a certain kind of ability or dispositional capacity, as opposed to a kind of propositional knowledge or *knowledge-that*. The Intellectualist holds that *knowledge-how* is a kind of *knowledge-that*, albeit a kind of *knowledge-that* with certain importantly distinctive properties. In this paper I compare these two views with a less familiar alternative according to which *knowledge-how* is a distinctive kind of true, and often merely tacit, belief. I argue that, on balance, this true-belief account does better than the standard views in meeting four plausible constraints on any theory of *knowledge-how*. These are the constraints that a theory of *knowledge-how* should accord with: (i) our intuitive ascriptions of *knowledge-how*; (ii) the conceptual role of *knowledge-how* ascriptions; (iii) plausible principles connecting *knowledge-how* and intentional action; and (iv) standard models in linguistics of the syntax and semantics of *knowledge-wh* ascriptions. I also argue that the true-belief account can accommodate the main motivations for both Ryleanism and Intellectualism, and that one can even view it as something of a rapprochement between these two positions. In closing I examine certain analogies between this account of *knowledge-how* and notions of "weak" or "minimal" knowledge.