Jonathan Adler (CUNY)

Contextualism, Fallibility, and the Value of Knowing
Can changes in the importance of being right alter the standards for knowledge? My critical analysis focuses on *contextualism*. The ultimate target is, however, defenses of 'pragmatic encroachment,' which answer affirmatively. Contextualism, the view that standards for knowledge vary with shifts in context (like higher costs of error or the introduction of new possibilities), is usually contrasted with *invariantism*. I begin with a straightforward contrast: Whose advice for action or assertion would you do better to follow—-the contextualist's or the invariantist's? I answer that it is the invariantist's. I apply the recommendation to a well known example offered by contextualists (DeRose): under *low (ordinary) standards* in *scenario one*, a wife asserts that the bank is open on Saturday, which is sufficient for her and her husband to wait until Saturday to deposit a check. However, *high standards* are induced in *scenario two* when her husband reminds her that if they do not deposit their check before Monday, they cannot cover a bill, and that banks sometimes change their (weekend) hours. According to contextualists, in scenario two, the wife refrains from assertion, admitting that she does not really know and that her previous knowledge claim (that the bank is open) failed. I argue that a better explanation of the wife's reaction is a consequence of unavoidable fallibilist policies of prudence and a natural distinction between belief (which is not affected by the alterations in costs of error) and confidence (which is so affected). The explanation I defend is extended to apply to the way standards are alleged to be shifted by the introduction of new possibilities, including familiar sceptical ones and the mild recent ones that Dretske, Nozick, and others have discussed in treating of whether if one knows that A and that A implies B one comes to know thereby B (a condition of closure).

Igor Douven (Leuven)

Proper Bootstrapping
According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easily to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that the argument relies on a type of reasoning we have independent reason to reject. We argue that the blanket rejection of that type of reasoning Weisberg recommends is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument.

Klemens Kappel (Copenhagen)

Is Epistemic Expressivism Incoherent?
I my presentation I will defend a form of epistemic expressivism, which is the general view that the normative parts of epistemic notions should be accounted for in expressivist terms, that is, along the lines of expressivist accounts of ethics. Epistemic expressivism may be applied to all epistemological notions in so far as they have a normative component, but here I will mainly knowledge. Roughly, epistemic expressivism about knowledge holds that to say that S's belief that p is known just is to express a particular kind of approval of S's belief that p and of the epistemic position in which S holds the belief that p. Recently such views have been argued to be incoherent by Terrence Cuneo, *The Normative* Web (Oxford 2007) and by Jonathan

Kvanvig, *The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding*, (Cambridge 2003). I shall discuss the main arguments offered by Cuneo and Kvanvig, and argue that they are far from decisive.

Christoph Kelp (Leuven)

A New(ish) Problem for the Closure Principle for Knowledge
Fred Dretske once famously used cases starring zebras and cleverly disguised mules to argue against the closure principle for knowledge. In this paper I argue even though, as presented by Dretske, cases like the zebra/cleverly disguised mule case fail to make a convincing case against the closure principle, they can be embedded in a certain way in cases of inquiry into whether one really knows such propositions as the one concerning the presence of zebras such that when conjoined with a couple of independently plausible assumptions about the nature of inquiry the closure principle comes under serious pressure. I offer an independently motivated restriction on the closure principle that, in the context of the relevant inquiries, will allow the subject to know such propositions as the one concerning the presence of zebras but won't license closure-based knowledge of propositions such as the one concerning the absence of cleverly disguised mules.

Igal Kvart (Hebrew University Jerusalem)

Counterfactuals and Knowledge
In this talk I will survey some main points of my chanced-based analysis of counterfactuals; then survey some main points of my chanced-based analysis of perceptual knowledge; and finally outline joint implications for counterfactual-based analyses of knowledge.

Erik Olsson (Lund)

What is the Problem of Generality?
The generality problem is usually taken to be close to a knockdown argument against process reliabilism, i.e. the view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief (satisfying a suitable anti-Gettier clause). In this paper, I argue that the generality issue, as it is usually understood, does not in fact present reliabilism with a genuine difficulty. There is, however, a related problem of showing how it is possible that we can commonly agree in our classifications of belief formation processes and on their reliability. This is a genuine matter, though perhaps more so for cognitive psychology than for philosophy itself. I propose to treat this remaining concern within the framework of the standard basic level theory due to Eleanor Rosch and her associates, which is a universal empirically-based theory of how to identify the cognitively most satisfactory level of classification in a given taxonomy. Thus, the main additional benefit of the approach is that it unifies work in epistemology and cognitive psychology.